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ABSTRACT
Sluggish price adjustments with respect to exchange rate shocks take essentially
two forms. Firstly, prices do not adjust completely to neutralize the effects of
nominal exchange rate shocks. Secondly, price adjustments after exchange rate
shocks only take place in discrete time intervals, in other words they are dis-
continuous. These two features of price adjustments form our definition of inter-
national price rigidities. In this paper we shall present a survey of the empirical
and theoretical literature on international price rigidities. We provide the under-
lying intuition of the theoretical research and present a brief summary of the
empirical findings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the international monetary economics literature, there exists a
long-standing debate as concerns the effectiveness of the exchange
rate instrument to correct for current account imbalances and stabili-
sation purposes. Conventional wisdom regarding the neutrality of
exchange rate policies is not justified by the empirical regularities. A
common observation is that nominal exchange rates are much more
volatile in comparison to aggregate or firm level prices in an econ-
omy providing scope for effective use of exchange rates as monetary
policy tools. 
There are four very closely related concepts in the handbook of
exchange rates and prices: The law of one price, the purchasing power
parity, the exchange rate pass-through and the pricing-to-market1. 
The law of one price (LOP) implies an identical price of an identi-
cal product across countries in the absence of distribution –, resale –,
transaction – or transportation costs. In this outset the exchange rate
is the simple conversion operator. The LOP is commonly accepted as
the touchstone for the degree of market integration of a particular
product. If the LOP can be extended to n- goods in economies engag-
ing in trade we can conveniently refer to the purchasing power parity
(PPP). There is extensive empirical evidence that exchange rate
changes are not necessarily followed by price adjustments to restore
PPP and often it requires long time periods for PPP to be met again.
If the nominal exchange rate changes have real effects on the
economies, one can forcefully defend independent exchange rate
policies.
The exchange rate pass-through (EPT) refers to the destination
currency import price changes with respect to a one percent change
in the exchange rate between exporting and importing countries. The
relationship between import prices and exchange rates is crucial in
the sense that devaluation is expected to improve the short-run com-
petitive position of a country that observes its currency depreciating.
If an exchange rate instrument has at least a short-run impact on a
country's competitiveness, an incomplete EPT is a partial explanation
for the famous J-curve result in international trade. Empirical studies
conducted so far give strong support for incomplete EPT.
The fourth concept captures microeconomic foundations of price
adjustments with respect to exchange rate changes. The pricing-to-
market (PTM) refers to the strategic pricing behaviour of firms
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engaged in international trade. Some multinational firms may find it
in their strategic interest not to reflect exchange rate swings in their
local currency prices. If the future prospects are positive multina-
tional firms may allow fluctuations in their profit margins. This may
be due to their interest in protecting their market share or due to the
existence of the sunk cost and exchange rate uncertainty. PTM
explicitly focuses on the international price discrimination of multi-
national firms in a domestic market. Consequently, LOP is often vio-
lated via firm specific pricing decisions2.
Although exchange rate pass-through and pricing-to-market have
been recognized a long time ago, they only gained attention after the
publication of the seminal papers of Krugman (1986) and Dornbusch
(1987) noting a less than proportional fall of US domestic prices with
respect to an appreciation of the US dollar in the early 1980's, com-
plemented by an insufficient adjustment in the foreign prices3. Later
on, several empirical studies verified incomplete pass-through (EPT)
and pricing-to-market (PTM) as common evidence in different inter-
national goods markets. Although there are numerous conflicting
reports about the level and the stability of the pass-through relation-
ship, it is commonly accepted that there is no one-to-one relationship
between the changes in exchange rates and price adjustments.
In this paper we aim to provide a survey of some partial equilib-
rium models dealing with two different aspects of international price
rigidities. First of all, prices do not adjust continuously with respect
to changes in the exchange rates. Secondly, even if the adjustment
occurs, it is often incomplete with respect to the exchange rate
changes. These two odd features of prices are which we review in
this paper. We shall refer to the incompleteness and/or discontinuity
of price adjustments as “the international price rigidities after
exchange rate shocks”.
Bulk of the literature focuses on the incomplete price adjustments.
Both static and dynamic aspects of incomplete price adjustments are
explored in ongoing research. Static aspects of pricing analysis incor-
porate strategic behaviour as suggested by Bulow et al. (1985) in
imperfectly competitive markets with product differentiation.
Dynamic analyses incorporate competition for market share or sunk
costs and enhance our understanding of price adjustment of individ-
ual firms.
Discontinuity feature of the price adjustments gained only limited
attention within the international context although there exists ample
177
evidence that nominal price changes occur only in discrete jumps4.
The arguments used to support this position rely on the existence of
some adjustment costs, more popularly on the menu costs5. 
Recent research in international macroeconomics attempts to cap-
ture these commonly observed features of international prices
derived from microfoundations. As Betts and Devereux (2000) note
pricing-to-market plays a crucial role in the exchange rate determina-
tion and international business cycles. The presence of pricing-to-
market limits the role of exchange rate policies to increase or
decrease aggregate demand in a certain country. A successful
exchange rate policy potentially requires larger shocks to fundamen-
tals thereby increasing the volatility of exchange rates. Secondly, an
aggregate pricing-to-market means departure from the PPP.
Therefore it constrains the comovements of consumption across
countries whereas increasing the comovements of output across
countries. Incorporation of microfoundations for international price
stickiness in the general equilibrium analysis proves to be crucial.
However, general equilibrium models are beyond the scope of this
survey paper6.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents short-term
models of incomplete price adjustments. Section III surveys the
dynamic aspects of incomplete price adjustment and its impact on
market structure. Section IV discusses briefly the discontinuity
aspects of international price rigidities. Section V summarizes the
empirical findings on international price rigidities, both for incom-
pleteness and discontinuity aspects. Finally, section VI concludes.
II. INCOMPLETE PRICE CHANGES: STATIC APPROACHES
Multinational firms usually take exchange rate fluctuations seriously
since exchange rate swings directly affect profit margins. Therefore
exchange rate shocks influence pricing, output and investment deci-
sions of individual firms7.
In this section, we shall present a survey of static models. In static
settings, firms are concerned with period-by-period change in the
profitability of their business with respect to exchange rate shocks.
Therefore the level of economic exposure to international shocks
determines the size and timing of a firm’s price change and strategic
pricing across firms8. Elements of imperfect competition, such as
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product differentiation, oligopolistic competition and vertical rela-
tionships in multinational production and trading activities shed some
light on the pricing process in international markets.
A. Elasticity Approach
We can easily relate the concept of pass-through to the demand and
supply elasticities of exports and imports. We start with the defini-
tions provided by Menon (1995). The demand function for an
imported good can be written as: 
(1)
whereas we can write the supply function for the same good as being: 
(2)
represents the quantity demanded, the quantity supplied and
e the nominal exchange rate. Differentiation of the above expressions
with respect to prices and solving for the equilibrium condition
yields9:
(3)
simplifying the expression results in:
(4)
This equation has a simple interpretation. The change in the
domestic price is a function of demand and supply elasticities for
imports. If the demand and (or) supply for imports are perfectly
elastic, the domestic price response will always be in line with
exchange rate changes. In other words, exchange rate pass-through
will be complete. This is not a realistic result. There is nothing
inherent in the analysis that can capture the timing of price
response, market structures as institutions and underlying quantity
response of the firms. Further we will look at other tools of analysis
developed by different scholars, which provided an attempt to
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understand the underlying characteristics of the pricing-to-market
phenomenon.
B. Market Structure and Product Differentiation
1. Quantity Competition
The elasticity approach is not sufficient to account for incomplete
price responses to exchange rate shocks. Product differentiation and
oligopolistic competition come as natural candidates to explain the
violation of the Law of One Price in the goods markets. In an impor-
tant paper Dornbusch (1987) provided a straightforward explanation
why oligopolistic competition and product differentiation may lead to
incomplete adjustment of prices10. 
Due to the simplicity and intuitive nature of its results, we shall
present a version of the Dornbusch model. In a n-firm model with
constant marginal cost technology-, and linear demand functions,
domestic and foreign firms engage in a quantity competition with dif-
ferentiated products. We can write the profit function for the domes-
tic firms as being: 
(5)
and the foreign firms profit function is represented as: 
(6)
where p stands for prices, y stands for output and e for the nominal
exchange rate. Furthermore, subscript D is for a domestic and sub-
script F is for a foreign country11. For the sake of simplicity, assume
that the firms use the same constant marginal cost technology to pro-
duce the final good (i.e. ). Secondly, it is assumed that mar-
kets are segmented, meaning that the supply responses to demand
shocks in, say, the domestic market, has no implications on the sup-
ply response in the foreign market. And thirdly we assume a linear
demand function represented as , so that we can write
the total supply in the domestic market as , where
represents the total number of firms active in the domes-
tic market.
FD nnN +=
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We assume that the reaction functions of the Cournot competition
are downward sloping. These best response functions represent the
response of the firms with respect to their opponent's strategy. In
most cases we have downward sloping reaction functions in the
Cournot Competition with linear demand and cost specifications.
This implies that firms' actions are strategic substitutes (see Bulow,
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985))12.
Taking the first order conditions to calculate the equilibrium level
of prices in the domestic market leads to the following price expres-
sion: 
(7)
where N= . We can write the price elasticities with respect to
exchange rates: 
(8)
which shows that under the Cournot set-up the prices are explicitly
dependent on the number of firms in the domestic market. An
increase of the number of the foreign firms (large market power of
the foreign firms in the domestic market) will tend to push-up the
prices in line with the exchange rate depreciation. Hence, under per-
fect competition this relation tends to be complete and exchange rate
changes are neutralized by the adjustments in prices. Naturally, the
weaker competition on the side of the foreign firms operating in the
domestic country tends to generate less than proportional price
adjustment with respect to exchange rate shocks. 
The price to marginal cost relation (represented by the second term
on the left hand side of the expression) allows us to derive an inter-
esting conclusion. The more competitive the foreign firms (smaller
mark-up) the higher the domestic price adjustment will be.
Thus, the simple Cournot model of Dornbusch is capable of
accounting for the incomplete domestic price adjustments with
respect to exchange rate shocks as a function of both the concen-
tration and the share of trade. An interesting aspect of quantity
competition analysis is its account of incomplete adjustment of
prices without any reliance on product differentiation. Naturally,
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price adjustments in the opposite direction occur in the foreign
country13.
2. Price Competition with Product Differentiation
Dornbusch (1987) offered an alternative price competition model
using Salop's spatial competition framework. In this set-up domes-
tic and foreign firms are located equidistantly and alternating on a
circle14. The model implies a two-stage game. In the first stage
firms decide to enter the market. In the second stage they compete
in prices. The entry decision depends on the disutility of consumers
per unit of distance, which in fact represents the level of product
differentiation, the market size and the fixed costs the firms incur
when they enter the market. Thus, the equilibrium number of
entrants is determined endogenously, when the size of the market is
given.
Next, Dornbusch (1987) derives the elasticities with respect to
exchange rate shocks. Foreign firms cannot perfectly adjust their
prices with respect to exchange rate shocks. Full adjustment of prices
would induce them to loose their market shares if they produce close
substitutes to domestically produced products. Yet, the Dornbusch
model fails to account for long-term implications of exchange rate
shocks, in other words entry and exit is excluded, since the model
implicitly relies on the assumption that domestic and foreign firms
alternate around the unitary circle. In fact Salop's model is designed
to account for entry and exit decisions of the firms. The assumption
that firms alternate around the circle does not allow one to address
issues of market structure. We will come back to an extension of the
Salop model when we investigate dynamic models and market struc-
ture changes15.
3. Input Price Shocks
Input prices can play a crucial role in explaining the price stickiness
at the final goods level. A simple illustrative example goes as fol-
lows. Assume a devaluation that automatically improves the compet-
itiveness of the firms located in the domestic country defined in
terms of domestic currency. The foreign firm's prices defined in
terms of the domestic currency will go up, whereas domestic prices
do not change. In the foreign country, however, there will be a
change in the opposite direction. A domestic firm's prices defined in
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terms of the domestic currency will be less, whereas the foreign
firms' prices in their own country ceteris paribus do not change. This
represents the direct effect of devaluation as discussed in the section
presenting models of quantity competition. On the other hand, trade
integration is certainly relevant for inputs as well. Primary and inter-
mediate goods play a crucial role in total trade transactions. Thus a
devaluation of the domestic currency is likely to increase the produc-
tion costs of the domestic firms, when part of the inputs are imported
from abroad. Importing inputs will be more expensive and the costs
of production of the final commodity will increase in line with the
exchange rate change. This clearly represents the indirect effects of
exchange rate shocks and these offsetting effects have strong policy
implications for exchange rate pass-through and exchange rate poli-
cies.
Here, there are two empirical facts that are worth the mention.
Firstly, empirical studies have well documented the fact that some
primary and intermediate goods prices do not completely adjust to
nominal exchange rate shocks16. This is particularly interesting for
primary goods, which are usually characterized by their homoge-
neous nature. Secondly, empirical research shows the substantial
impact of input price effects due to exchange rate shocks on the final
good prices17.
Knetter (1993), Athukorala and Menon (1994), and Campa and
Goldberg ((1995), (1997)) give a partial account of the relevance of
these input price shocks. A recent study by Aksoy and Riyanto (2000)
developed a two stage game model wherein different institutional set-
ups, in other words vertical integration and vertical separation, and
strategic interaction among the firms matter. A vertically integrated
firm, or in other words, a firm engaged in the production of both
inputs and final goods, will have a strategic advantage in deciding the
input prices it will charge as higher strategic input pricing may
increase its rivals' costs. In line with certain conclusions reached in
the strategic trade literature regarding vertically related markets,
exchange rate changes will influence the pricing decisions in a simi-
lar way18. When the foreign market is characterized by vertically
integrated firms and the domestic market is not, an exchange rate
shock is likely to lead to a higher level of pass-through in the final
goods market. This arises due to the market power of the foreign firm
in the inputs market that makes the adjustment of prices in the final
goods market straightforward.
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III. INCOMPLETE PRICE CHANGES: DYNAMIC APPROACHES
The static literature is partially capable of accounting for incomplete
price adjustments in the final goods markets. Although they provide
intuitive explanations for incomplete price adjustments what is likely
to be missed is how price adjustments take place over time and
whether incompleteness is a persistent / permanent fact. Exchange
rate expectations are neglected and firms pricing decisions are
abstracted from time. Its results are dependent on the nature of the
competition, assumptions about the strategic interaction between
competing firms and the shape of the demand and cost functions.
Naturally, static analysis does not take into consideration eventual
changes in the market structure due to a nominal shock. Its underly-
ing assumption is that in the long-run macroeconomic aggregates are
not affected by monetary shocks. However, recent research proved
that the inherent dynamics of the pricing process are crucial. Here,
firms´ interest lies in the expected value of the firm rather than on the
period-by-period profits or revenues where the firm’s value is mea-
sured as the present discounted value of expected future cash flows. 
Essentially, a simple modification in the analysis to capture
dynamics can lead to an interesting and very powerful result. If a
shock on the nominal exchange rates can trigger persistent and even
permanent effects on the trading relationships (and hence on the real
economy) this brings one essentially at odds with the idea of long-
term neutrality of monetary shocks which underlies all mainstream
(New Keynesian or a Real Business Cycle) macroeconomic models.
The question then becomes: May an exchange rate shock cause a
change in the market structure?
The answer is yes. Incorporation of sunk costs in a dynamic frame-
work establishes this result. In the following sections we will provide
an overview of the literature capturing pricing dynamics after an
exchange rate shock. We will divide the literature into supply- and
demand side analysis. These models are what we will turn to in the
following subsections.
A. Supply Side Analysis
If exchange rate shocks trigger entry and exit on the side of the inter-
nationally active trade firms in a certain domestic market, we are
immediately confronted with market structure changes. There are two
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lines of research with sunk cost arguments: The beachhead model
and a model of circular competition. We explain first the beachhead
model.
1. The Beachhead Model
Hysteresis literature captures the dynamic implications that exchange
rate shocks may have on the market structure. Temporary exchange
rate shocks can have permanent effects via its influence on the mar-
ket structure. According to Baldwin (1988) a firm incurs some fixed
costs when it enters in a particular export market (costs of marketing,
distribution networks, brand name establishment and so on). These
costs are sunk, such that they are not recoverable once the firm has
entered the market. However, by entering the market, firms anticipate
their expected discounted flow of net profits at least to cover these
sunk costs in the future19. Put differently, sunk costs determine the
number of firms acting in the market. On the other hand, firms usu-
ally incur a recurrent fixed cost in order to maintain their gained mar-
ket shares. (for instance, costs of regular advertisement, extension of
distribution networks etc.) Such maintenance costs directly affect the
level of profits of the firms in the domestic market.
A change in the exchange rate may lead to foreign firms changing
their behaviour in the domestic market. Foreign firms may be reluc-
tant to leave the market even if their operating profits become nega-
tive due to, say, devaluation, because of the sunk costs already
incurred. This decision will be explicitly dependent on the perception
of the nature of the shock. The size and persistence of the exchange
rate shock is the key to the exit /stay decision. Alternatively, since re-
entry includes a regeneration of sunk costs, firms may take this into
consideration before they decide to leave the domestic market.
Thus, this model has the feature of being able to account for a
pricing-to-market range where the market structure will not be
affected and the import prices will be less responsive (temporary
pricing-to-market effects) as well as for permanent changes in the
market structure (permanent exit and entry effects)20.
Let us briefly present the model. Using a slightly modified version
of the Spence and Dixit and Stiglitz (S-D-S) framework, Baldwin
(1988) assumes perfect foresight and therefore a fully predictable
deterministic exchange rate path, whereas Baldwin and Krugman
(1989) allow for more realistic stochastic behavior of exchange rates.
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We focus on the Baldwin's version (1988) that will serve as the
benchmark framework. Let us express the discounted flow of future
profits gross of sunk cost for the domestic firm as a case in which
where firms produce a variety of a particular good y and engage in
quantity competition:
(9)
and for the foreign firm: 
(10)
where parameter F represents the recurrent fixed costs to be paid at
every period. S represents the sunk costs incurred when firms decided
to enter the market at t=1. Note that S and F are assumed to be equal
across firms and varieties, but S>F. Let us denote , with r
being the constant market discount factor and e as the nominal
exchange rate21. The variable m represents the total number of vari-
eties22. The implication of the S-D-S model is that the inverse
demand functions are identical across firms, although they are for a
different variety.
Equations (9) and (10) indicate firms' decision rule to enter the
domestic market. They anticipate covering at least the sunk cost they
incurred, once they decide to enter the domestic market. In other
words, they calculate the expected discounted flow of net profits to
be at least equal to S. Therefore, we can derive the entry and exit
conditions of the domestic and foreign firms from the discounted
reduced form profits (ignoring the integer problem) and write:
Entry: (11)
Exit: (12)
where OΠ represents the optimal profits from the first order condi-
tions. Note that (11) represents entry conditions for domestic and
foreign firms and (12) the exit conditions23. The gap between the
exit- and entry conditions clearly provides the explanation for the
0*0* <Π<Π FtDt ORandOR
FORandFOR F
t
D
t >Π>Π **
r
Rt
+
=
1
1
( )( ) SFycyympR
t
FFFFD
t
F −


−−=Π ∑∞
= 0
,
( )( ) SFycyympR
t
DDDDD
t
D −


−−=Π ∑∞
=0
,
186
hysteresis result of the Baldwin model. In this set-up, the firm num-
ber can change in the period-by-period equilibria. 
An exchange rate shock typically drives firms away from the sym-
metric equilibrium. In this case, large and small devaluations have
different implications for market structure. A small devaluation does
not change the market structure. Firms stay in the market even if they
accumulate losses during the deviation period of the exchange rate
from its PPP level. In order to protect their market shares, these firms
price to market, which is calculated from the price elasticities of
exchange rates. Baldwin shows that under small devaluations there
will be no decrease in the varieties. When the exchange rate returns
to its initial value, prices adjust fully and pre-shock equilibrium is re-
established.
In case of large devaluations, some firms will find it profitable
rather to leave the market. Thus, due to a decrease in the variety, less
than proportional price adjustment will not be restored when the
exchange rate returns to its initial level. Price levels and trade vol-
umes will change irreversibly.
Dixit (1989) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) extended
Baldwin's framework by relaxing the deterministic exchange rate
path. Baldwin and Krugman (1989) model the exchange rate as an
i.i.d. random variable. More interestingly, the entry-exit decisions
(and therefore also the market structure) are allowed to give feedback
to the exchange rate. Their basic conclusion is that when a large
exchange rate shock provokes sufficiently large capital inflows or
outflows in a domestic country, the exchange rate cannot return to its
initial value. This result is the outcome of entry and exit decisions
and causes a structural break in the equilibrium exchange rate.
Dixit (1989) models exchange rates as following a random walk24.
His conclusions are in line with those of Baldwin and Krugman.
However, he also relaxes the assumption of invariant sunk costs.
With asymmetric sunk costs across firms he finds that those firms
with the smallest sunk cost will be the first to enter and the first to
leave. If the currency starts to appreciate foreign firms with relatively
small sunk costs will start to enter. If the exchange rate reverts to
establish its PPP level, the firms with smaller sunk entry costs will
exit, and those having invested a larger sum in order to enter, will
stay in the domestic market and will price to market25.
Baldwin and Lyons (1994) analyzed the long-term effects of
exchange rate shocks at the cross-section of Dornbusch's overshoot-
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ing model and the sunk cost argument. Their results confirm the pre-
vious literature. Furthermore, the application of the Dornbusch model
allows them to derive some tentative policy conclusions. They argue
that given that prices are sticky, a monetary shock will translate to a
greater likelihood of hysteresis. This is a challenge to Dornbusch's
model that foresees a long-term neutrality of (nominal) policy-
induced shocks.
Another contribution to the hysteresis literature is made by Lin and
Tseng (1993). In their model they look at the permanent impact of the
devaluations on the current account via macroeconomic decision vari-
ables such as consumption and investment. Effects of the exchange rate
on the labour market are also analyzed. They combine the Dixit-Stiglitz
model (fixed mark-up over constant marginal cost) in an intertemporal
maximization framework with the sunk-cost argument of Baldwin and
find that devaluation would firstly decrease the sunk and maintenance
costs of a foreign firm measured in the foreign currency. This would
make the entrance of firms into the domestic market cheaper and would
lead to an increase in investment so that individuals should instanta-
neously and permanently decrease their consumption in order to
accommodate the new entrants or new varieties, which will decrease
labour demand. This puts pressure on real wages, and therefore domes-
tic real wages decrease. This apparently constitutes a boost in the over-
all intertemporal profits of the incumbent firm. In the long-run foreign
asset stock would be reduced so that the current account deteriorates.
2. Sunk Costs and Circular Aspects
Aksoy and Lustig (1998) use a modified version of the Salop model
for spatial competition. As mentioned earlier, Dornbusch's (1987)
account of Salop's model does not cover entry and exit decisions. In
fact, Salop's model is designed for this purpose. Again the existence
of sunk entry costs is the key for understanding the hysteresis result.
A foreign homogeneous good producer will be more vulnerable to
devaluations than a firm producing a highly differentiated brand,
where consumers buy only one brand of a particular product. Aksoy
and Lustig (1998) identify the foreign firm which is due to exit after
an exchange rate shock and are able to show that exchange rate trig-
gered price increases are more likely to occur than exchange rate trig-
gered price decreases. Entry requires high sunk costs, whereas exit is
either costless or less costly.
188
Both types of supply side analysis shed some light on some recent
observations. As Friberg (1999) notes following the Korean exchange
rate crisis Volvo took the opportunity to buy part of a Korean firm
Samsung hence strengthened its position. Similarly, General Motors,
Ford, P&G and Shell, all were looking Korean firms to purchase. As
the sunk costs approaches to nil (in terms of domestic currency), it
becomes easier for multinational firms to enter a country either for
trading or investment purposes. Most importantly, a change in the
market structure, therefore a change in the production process, trig-
gers a violation of long run neutrality of a nominal variable, namely
exchange rates. 
B. Demand Side Analysis
Demand side analysis is a complement to supply side analysis. As
Froot and Klemperer ((1989) p.638) put it, in both types of dynamic
models, firms can make initial investments in foreign markets that
give them the opportunity to earn future profits. In supply side models
these investments take the form of sales infrastructure, whereas
demand side models investments purchase consumer allegiance. Both
of these can be interpreted as firm specific investments in either
invisible assets or future demands.
Demand side analysis results are independent of entry and exit
decisions and exchange rate uncertainty. Hence, these models do not
imply hysteresis but confirm pricing-to-market result from the static
theory.
1. Competition for Market Share
Firms' future demands and profits are dependent on their current mar-
ket shares. Brand loyalty of consumers is a common phenomenon.
Switching costs, transaction costs of switching suppliers or search
costs may induce consumers to consume the same brand of a product.
Due to the existence of such rigidities, past market shares would mat-
ter when firms decide on their pricing strategies. As a consequence,
any expected change in the exchange rate will influence the value of
current market share and thus will affect the pricing behaviour of
firms. Froot and Klemperer (1989) address this idea in a two period
oligopolistic competition setting with perfect capital mobility in a
domestic market.
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In the case of appreciation of the domestic currency their findings
suggest that the foreign firms price more aggressively in the domes-
tic market in order to gain larger market share, if the price of the
domestic currency is expected to stay permanently at a higher level.
If exchange rate change is perceived to be temporary, foreign firms
will behave less aggressively. This result hinges on the cost- and real
interest effects. The cost effect is the first period decrease (here,
domestic currency appreciates) of foreign firms' production costs.
This tends to decrease the prices of the foreign firms in the domestic
market. On the other hand, the real interest effect can be set out as
follows: a temporary appreciation makes future domestic currency
profits of the foreign firm relatively less valuable than its current
profits (defined in domestic currency). This induces the foreign firm
to increase its prices. The relative magnitude of these two opposing
effects and the perception of the nature of the exchange rate shock
determine the prices in the domestic market. The result is indepen-
dent from the type of competition and specific assumptions about the
model. However, potential perverse reactions of prices are closely
linked with capital mobility. In this study the exchange rate path is
modelled as a deterministic path and expectations are not formed
endogenously26. Obviously, these assumptions are quite restrictive.
Nevertheless, the model provides interesting insights into the ques-
tion.
Tivig (1996) provides an extension to the work of Froot and
Klemperer. She argues that the microeconomic foundations of the
J-curve hinges on the intertemporal maximization problem. In a two-
period model of duopolistic competition with differentiated products
and constant marginal costs she relaxes the assumption of perfect
capital mobility. Tivig finds, regardless of the degree of capital
mobility, possibility of 'perverse' price reactions to changes in the
exchange rates. The reason for this finding is the intertemporal profit
maximization hypothesis itself. With complementary demands duop-
olists are not forced to operate each period in the elastic region of
their demand functions, which generates the potential perverse out-
come. In this framework, a first period perverse reaction is possible.
In the second period this can be corrected. 
Broadly speaking, demand side analysis does not necessarily argue
for a permanent impact of nominal exchange rates changes. In this
sense this type of analysis can be grouped together with static analy-
sis of PTM and EPT.
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IV. DISCONTINUOUS PRICE CHANGES: MENU COSTS
A fundamental observation that underlies the New-Keynesian analy-
sis is that economic decisions are often characterized by periods of an
inactive state that is followed by a change in prices. Price adjust-
ments do not follow nominal changes immediately (in other words,
these are discontinuous). Current research on price dynamics sug-
gests that firms apply a simple price change rule in which real (unob-
served) prices fluctuate between two predetermined bounds. Firms
take an action if and only if real prices reach one of these bounds and
we observe price changes. According to (among others) Sheshinski
and Weiss (1983) these bounds are determined by the price adjust-
ment costs firms face. This type of linear or fixed adjustment costs is
often referred to as menu costs. A precise description of the menu
costs is not provided in the literature. However, one can think of
menu costs as Fluet and Phaneuf (1997) put:
“...in response to small shifts in demand, imperfectly competitive firms do
not adjust their prices, because, starting from the profit maximizing price-
quantity combination, the gains in profits from small changes in prices
are only second-order.”
According to the literature, these costs basically represent the admin-
istrative and executive costs of changing the prices27.
The commonly applied methodology that analyses infrequent price
adjustment in the dynamic context is borrowed from the inventory
models, the so-called sS policies28. In this framework, timing of price
changes is endogenously determined. However, the main difficulty
lies in the empirical applications, since price adjustment costs are
unobservable. 
Theoretically, the incorporation of the menu costs in the dynamic
setting is quite similar to the incorporation of the sunk costs in the
analysis of price stickiness. The main difference lies in the research
scope. The sunk cost argument provides the intuition to understand
the market structure changes, in other words, permanent incomplete
price adjustments. The menu cost argument becomes useful in under-
standing the discontinuity of price changes after exchange rate
shocks.
However, the applications of sS economies to the observed price
rigidities in the international economic environment had to wait for
rather a long time. To our knowledge the first (and only) attempt of
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such an application is given by Delgado (1991) within a dynamic
programming framework. He derives a formal rule for the pricing
policies of the multinational firms active in a domestic market. In his
model, exchange rates follow a geometric Brownian motion with
drift, which plausibly resembles reality. Rather than applying fixed
menu costs he uses increasing menu costs. Menu costs largely result
from the increased advertising that firms have to incur to retain their
lost consumers29. Foreign firms maximize the net discounted value of
flow profits minus menu costs. More formally, the firm solves the
following value function (V) of the international business as a func-
tion of the product prices (P) and the nominal exchange rate (S): 
(13)
where Pt represents the flow profits quoted in local currency, I the
index function of changing the prices, u the cost of increasing the
price and d the cost of decreasing the price, which are dependent on
the size of the price change (see Delgado (1991)). Briefly said, the
firm's problem is to maximize the expected value of the discounted
flow of net profits over the menu costs it faces in each period. When
the net profit flow over the infinite time horizon exceeds the costs of
changing the prices, the firm would be willing to change its prices.
Solution with optimal stopping suggests the existence of bounds of
inaction within which prices remain unchanged. In such an analysis,
analytical solutions are in general difficult to obtain. Therefore,
Delgado assesses the impact of exchange rate shocks on prices in the
presence of menu costs with numerical analysis. Comparative
dynamics with plausible parameter specifications imply that firms
will change their prices if and only if the real price reaches the
bounds of inaction that is determined by the menu costs and
exchange rate variability. However, once the bound of inaction is
reached, adjustment will be complete, a result that is not in line with
the empirical regularity of incomplete price adjustments.
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Substantial research has been devoted to the issue of price adjust-
ments with respect to exchange rate changes. Generally, empirical
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findings on pricing-to-market and exchange rate pass-through show
that exchange rate induced price discrimination in international mar-
kets is crucial in almost all manufacturing markets. Therefore, empir-
ical research largely favors the argument that the international goods
markets are segmented30. 
A. Summary of Empirical Evidence
Table 1 provides a selection of recent empirical evidence in the liter-
ature.
TABLE 1
A Selection of Empirical Studies
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1. Incompleteness of Price Changes
Table 1 provides a summary of empirical evidence in the literature.
Main results from the literature can be summarized as follows. (See
also Menon (1995)).
Pass-through: degree and dynamics
Incomplete pass-through is a common and pervasive phenomenon in
the studies surveyed. Only 6 studies report complete or near complete
pass-through across countries in different goods markets.
Pass-through across countries
Pass-through is significantly different across countries. Note that
these studies opt for different methodologies, which makes the com-
parison much harder. Therefore, in the following we will refer to the
study of Knetter (1993) wherein he applies the same econometric
methodology across countries, which will ease the task.
Pass-through across studies for a given country
There are conflicting reports across studies as concerns the size of the
pass-through for a given country, which is fairly natural due to the
choice of the methodology and data.
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Pass-through across products
This is a direct test of the pricing-to-market. Studies report a strongly
divergent level of pass-through across countries in different goods
markets. International price discrimination is common.
Stability of pass-through relationship
There are numerous conflicting reports regarding the persistence and
level of the pass-through relationship.
Knetter (1993) uses the term “local currency price stability” when he
compares price discrimination practices in the cross-country context
using data for seven-digit industries for the period of 1973-198731. The
term aims to define the decline of the foreign producers' (exporters')
mark-ups when they are confronted with a depreciating domestic cur-
rency. Apparently, Japanese, German and British export industries
exhibit more local currency price stability than the US exports indus-
tries in the study. However, he finds in general that, industry effects
tend to dominate source country effects in terms of price discriminatory
behavior of firms. Secondly, destination specific mark-up changes are
very similar across destination markets. The degree of local currency
price stability is nearly identical across destination markets for a partic-
ular good, which generates doubt regarding the belief about the exis-
tence of systematic discrimination across countries. The third finding
rejects the hypothesis of an identical mark-up decline in all industries
within a given destination country. Thus price adjustment exercise has a
strongly heterogeneous nature across industries within a given country.
The common explanation for the presence of pricing-to-market
found in most of the studies is the mark-up adjustment in different
industries. As Goldberg and Knetter (1999) put it the existence of
exchange rate induced, destination specific, variation in mark-ups
implies that price cannot equal marginal cost on shipments to all des-
tinations. The finding of price discrimination in the PTM literature
allows rejection of the null hypothesis of integrated world markets.
Relevance of Sunk Costs
In line with the theoretical research Roberts and Tybout (1997) show
that sunk costs play a crucial role in the decision to export with the
use of Colombian plant level panel data over the period 1981-89.
Their empirical findings suggest that theoretical sunk costs literature
are relevant as the firms decisions to export are significantly affected
by the firms prior relevant export-market experiments. 
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2. Discontinuity of Price Changes
Only a few studies analyzed discontinuous price adjustments related
to menu costs. One has to remember that conducting an empirical
study to measure the level of pricing-to-market is not necessarily reli-
able, unless there is data at the most disaggregated level. The main
difficulty of analysing firm specific pricing rules is data availability.
Firstly, data should contain information of a single homogeneous
good. Any composite price index blurs analysis of pricing behavior.
Secondly, in order to be able to pass fair judgement on the individual
firms' pricing decisions one needs high frequency price data (say,
weekly or monthly data). Low frequency data hides all information
about in-between price adjustment exercises. An exception is the
study of Ghosh and Wolf (1994) in which they use cover price data
of the journal The Economist. A probit analysis with a relevant proxy
for menu costs (deviations from the Law of One Price) led them to
conclude that when menu costs are present, statistically significant
findings of the pricing-to-market behavior may be spurious. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The issue of incomplete and discontinuous adjustment of prices to
exchange rate changes is not a new one. However, this phenomenon
only gained attention after the seminal writings of Krugman (1986)
and Dornbusch (1987), which noted the significant impact of
exchange rate shocks on trade volumes and several scholars reported
discontinuous and disproportionate adjustment of prices. Recent the-
oretical and empirical research devoted its attention to firm level
pricing behavior after exchange rate shocks underlying the incom-
plete pass-through and the failure of the law of one price results in
different goods markets.
There are two main streams of analysis that evaluate the exchange
rate induced incomplete price adjustments in international econom-
ics. Static theoretical research pins down the importance of price dif-
ferentiation, market size and type of competition. Dynamic analysis
on the other hand introduces elements of sunk costs, which allows
accounting for the stylised facts of hysteresis in import volumes and
price levels. The discontinuity feature, however, received relative less
attention in the international context. 
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Empirical evidence confirms pricing-to-market as a common
strategic behavior of firms. This obviously implies that the markets
are segmented in international trade activities. However, one should
be cautious in evaluating the results when menu costs are present. 
Finally, recent research in the line of New Keynesian international
macroeconomics aims to provide microfoundations for international
price stickiness following exchange rate shocks. However, these
microfoundations heavily rely on the incompleteness feature of price
adjustments. To our knowledge discontinuity feature is not explicitly
taken into account in modelling. 
NOTES
1. For an excellent analysis of exchange rates and prices see Goldberg and Knetter
(1997). For a detailed account of PPP failure see Rogoff (1996).
2. In order to provide a secure profits firms usually engage in hedging activities. A
detailed discussion of these issues is provided by Friberg (1999).
3. See Branson (1972) writings after Smithsonian realignments.
4. See for example Cecchetti (1986) or Lach and Tsiddon (1992) for evidence in domes-
tic inflationary environments and Gosh and Wolf (1994) for an application in the
international context.
5. Blinder et al. (1998) provide with valuable insider information regarding the firm
specific pricing decisions in a domestic market. Although international dimensions
are neglected and direct questions about strategic interaction and collusion are omit-
ted from the survey (in order to provide as many responses as possible) it is interest-
ing to note that the survey outcome suggest that coordination failures, (i.e. firms
holding back on price changes waiting for other firms to go first) appears as the most
important element in pricing decisions. Costly price adjustment is seen to be rather
unimportant.
6. For these recently expanding literature see for example Obstfeld and Rogoff
((1995), (1998), (2000)), Betts and Devereux (1996).
7. For several anecdotal evidence covering incompleteness feature of international
prices, see Friberg (1999). 
8. According to Friberg (1999) economic exposure is defined as the sensitivity in the
value of the firm to exchange rate surprises. Firm´s value is measured as the present
discounted value of expected future cash flows. In static terms the focus is on the
period by period profits or revenues.
9. Defining elasticity of demand as being and elasticity of supply as being
(See Menon (1995)).
10. Baniak and Phlips (1995), Kirman and Phlips (1996) and Hens et al. (1999) provide
a similar model in the general framework.
11. In other words, stands for the domestic firm's output for the domestic market
and stands for the domestic firm's output for the foreign market and so on. 
12. A final good is said to be a strategic substitute (strategic complement) if a more
aggressive strategy by a player, e.g. a higher quantity, decreases (increases) the oppo-
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nent's marginal profitability. More formally, we can express the strategic substi-
tutability and complementarity as the second order partial derivatives with respect to
the rival's strategic variable. For instance, for a foreign firm in the domestic final
good market strategic substitutability can be written as . Alternatively,
suppose we have we encounter strategic
complementarity. For the
foreign firm in the domestic market we write for strategic substitutes
and for strategic complements. The similar reasoning applies for the
foreign market.
13. Although some authors have proven that `perverse' price adjustment can occur under
particular extreme set-ups, we will neglect this possibility for tractability reasons. For
such analysis see Hens et al. (1991) and Kirman and Phlips (1996). 
14. The alternating firms assumption is replaced by a clustering of the firms in recent
research. See Aksoy and Lustig (1998).
15. For the case of Bertrand competition in differentiated goods see Friberg (1997).
16. See for example Gilbert ((1989), (1991)), Amano and Van Norden (1998) and Cote
(1987). Such examples of systematic deviations from the PPP likely suggest pricing-
to-market even in these homogeneous markets.
17. See Athukorala and Menon (1994) and Campa and Goldberg (1995) among others.
18. See for example Spencer and Jones ((1991), (1992)).
19. This view was subject to the studies of Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Dixit (1989)
and Baldwin and Lyons (1994).
20. Empirical tests of the hysteresis hypothesis are rather rare. See Roberts and Tybout
(1998) for an application of the sunk cost idea to the Colombian firm level data. They
find firm evidence of the relevance of sunk costs, in order to explain hysteresis in
trade volumes and prices.
21. Assume that the second order profit maximization condition is satisfied.
22. In line with Chamberlain's conclusions an increase in the varieties in an industry can
be seen to shift demand for each variety downwards making them more elastic.
23. Verify from (9) and (10).
24. In line with the findings of Meese and Rogoff (1983).
25. Ansic and Pugh (1997) conducted an interesting laboratory experiment on the market
exit and entry decisions in the presence of sunk costs and exchange rate uncertainty.
Their findings support the view that sunk costs play a crucial role in trade activity. It
suggests that the band of inaction widens as the variance of exchange rate is high and
sunk costs are sufficiently large. A recent study by Campa (1998) argues that sunk
costs were crucial in the entry-exit decisions of Spanish manufacturing exporters. He
finds that exchange rate uncertainty does not play an important role in entry-exit
decisions.
26. For a controversial result of the impact of exchange rate shocks on market shares, see
Cabral and Mello (1997). They find that in an asymmetric duopoly framework, tem-
porary exchange rate shocks have a larger impact on market shares than permanent
exchange rate shocks.
27. See for instance, Delgado (1993) or Sheshinski and Weiss ((1983), (1993)).
28. Another class of models applied to closed economies stipulate a set time period with
fixed nominal prices-the contract period. The researchers then focus on what deter-
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mines the length of the pricing contract, the real price behaviour within this contract
period and the extent to which further contracts are linked with the earlier ones. In
this survey paper we will neglect this type of analysis since this did not find an appli-
cation area in the international context. For an excellent detailed analysis of sS
economies consult Sheshinski and Weiss (1993). For a general equilibrium perspec-
tive see Danziger (1999).
29. In other words, the firm's adjustment costs increase as a function of the changes in
the demand function. This assumption stands at odds with the standard fixed adjust-
ment costs literature, where menu costs represent just the administrative or execution
costs of changing the price. In particular, capturing demand elements in the adjust-
ment cost function should cause some strategic complications in his analysis.
30. See Menon (1995) who conducted an excellent survey comprising 46 studies
analysing exchange rate pass-through. In these 46 studies the following countries are
tested for the exchange rate pass-through: the US, Japan, Australia, Germany,
Canada, the UK, Korea, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Taiwan, Botswana,
Papua New Guinea, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
31. Sample data covers the UK, the USA, Germany and Japan.
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